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Abstract 
The reasons why most small-rights holders do not participate in management of the 
fishery for small pelagic fish (‘small pelagics’) in South Africa, despite legislation and 
policy encouraging their participation, were analysed. Membership of the Small 
Pelagics Management Working Group (SPMWG), the main participatory governance 
organ, is limited to representatives of recognised stakeholder associations. Rights 
holders therefore have to belong to a stakeholder association, which then selects a 
member or members to represent them on the SPMWG. Small quotas and the 
difficulties of sourcing capital mean that small-rights holders are not able to invest in 
infrastructure. Besides, most of the small-rights holders and their companies lack 
experience and management skills to survive independently in this highly competitive 
industry, which is based on high volume and low profit margins. As a result, most of 
the small-rights holders have no option but to enter into complex catching and 
processing agreements with vessel- and factory owners belonging to the existing 
recognised stakeholder associations. For the small-rights holders, it does not make 
sense to join these associations or even to form their own if they cannot actively 
participate in the industry independently. Greater participation by small-rights holders 
should start with their genuine integration into the industry through improved ability to 
invest in infrastructure and through management skills development. Most likely, this 
will require an interventionist approach by government. 
Introduction: 
South Africa’s Constitution (RSA 1996, sections 40 and 41 in particular) provides 
the foundation for cooperative governance and enshrines the involvement of citizens 
in decisions over issues that affect them, such as the management of natural 
resources. This is further strengthened through Chapter 2 of the National 
Environmental Management Act (NEMA; RSA 1998a) – the overarching legislation 
for management of the environment in South Africa. NEMA is the first step in giving 
legal effect to the environmental rights in the Constitution through, among others, 
promotion of participation of stakeholders in environmental governance. Public 
participation in environmental management is therefore a legal requirement in 
South Africa. In this context, the Marine Living Resources Act (MLRA; RSA 1998b) 
gives legal and operational effect to the imperatives of the Constitution and of NEMA. 
2 
Participatory management (co-management) refers to an institutional and 
organisational arrangement between government and user groups for effective 
management of a defined fishery (Jentoft 1989; Sen and Raakjær Nielsen 1996). The 
general functions of co-management have been identified as: the sharing of power and 
responsibility for management decision-making; the encouragement of partnerships; 
and provision of user incentives for sustainable use of resources (Wilson et al. 2003). 
Participatory management is a compromise between government concerns for 
sustainable utilisation and conservation (as the custodian of public resources) on the 
one hand, and users’ demands for equal opportunities, self-determination and self-
control on the other. The approach makes two assumptions: that users must have a 
stake in management and, secondly, that partnership between government agencies and 
resource users is essential for positive management outcomes. Participatory 
management goes beyond mere consultation in that users not only have a direct role in 
decision-making but also have the authority to make and implement decisions in specified 
areas of responsibility (Jentoft and McCay 1995; Hersoug and Rånes 1997). 
When organising for co-management, the issues that have to be addressed are 
similar to those in the theory of democracy and raise the classic questions of 
‘representation’ and ‘scale’ (Mikalsen 1998; Gray 2005a). One of the greatest challenges 
is balancing these two problems of the democratic process. In the South African fishing 
industry, as in most other fishing industries, a common problem for the 
representation of user group interests is that, all too often, they reflect the internal 
divisions of a heterogeneous industry that traverses sectoral, size, geographic and 
historic racial lines. As a result of these divisions, capabilities and aspirations for 
deeper involvement in the co-management process may be limited. A prerequisite 
for successful co-management is its inclusiveness and a relatively simple 
organisational structure incorporating strong, widely respected and fully representative 
user-group organisations (Mikalsen 1998; Wilson et al. 2003; Gray 2005b). One of 
the most difficult aspects of co-management is deciding which stakeholders should be 
represented and how those representatives should be chosen. Symes (1997) points out 
that most so-called co-management systems are based on single-interest 
representation  drawn  from the harvesting sector. There is strong argument in most 
instances for co-management to be more inclusive and to include multiple interests 
in pursuit of a more broadly constructed agenda (Bavinck et al. 2005; Kooiman et al. 
2005; Swyngedouw 2005), even though  this  presents the problem that representation 
could be expanded to unmanageable levels (Mikalsen et al. 1996). Hence there is need 
to decide how the institutional set-up can be as democratic and as inclusive as 
possible without sacrificing its efficiency. As a result, the last few years have seen a shift 
towards the concept of fisheries governance 1  (Bavinck et al. 2005; Kooiman et al. 
2005; Swyngedouw 2005; Symes 2006). Co-governance organisations cannot, 
therefore, afford to be too large; yet the alienation of particular stakeholder groups 
risks the erosion of co-governance’s greatest benefit – the  legitimacy of the system 
1
 ‘Governance is the whole body of public as well as private interactions taken to solve problems and create societal 
opportunities. It includes the formulation of principles guiding those interactions and the care for institutions that 
enable them’ (Kooiman and Bavinck 2005, p 17) 
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and its outputs (Mikalsen 1998; Bavinck et al. 2005; Kooiman et al. 2005). The issue of 
scale raises the question of the locus of user participation. The solution to this 
appears to be similar to democracy; that democracy works better in small settings 
(Michels 1915; Mikalsen et al. 1996). The larger the organisation, the more difficult it is to 
maintain a democratic process based on direct participation. With increasing scale, 
organisations tend to rely more on aggregation rather than integration in the decision-
making process (Mikalsen et al. 1996; Symes 2006). With aggregation, the tendency is 
for members to become more focused on winning instead of trying to reach agreement 
on what position their organisation should take on management issues. 
South African commercial fisheries have historical precedence in the form of the 
commercial industry working closely with the management authority (the former Sea 
Fisheries Authority), albeit as an exclusionary form of participatory management 
under apartheid (Hutton et al. unpublished data). 2  With the promulgation of the 
MLRA following democracy in 1994, a great number of new rights holders (those that 
joined the industry post 1994) from the historically disadvantaged racial groups entered 
the fishing industry (Raakjær Nielsen and Hara 2006; Isaacs et al. 2007; Hara and 
Raakjær 2009). The policy for long-term rights (DEAT 2005a, 2005b) requires the 
establishment of working groups for management of commercial fisheries. 
In the sector for small pelagic fish (‘small pelagics’), the Scientific Working Group 
(SWG) and the Small Pelagics Management Working Group (SPMWG) are the formal 
governance structures for the sector where scientists, representatives of stakeholder 
groups and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) discuss scientific and management 
issues for recommendation to the Deputy Director General (DDG; head of the Branch: 
Fisheries Management, in the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
[DAFF]) for final decision (DAFF 2010). Some of the key objectives of the SWG are to 
recommend  total allowable catches (TACs) and total allowable bycatches (TABs) to 
the Chief Director: Marine Resource Management and for developing decision tools such 
as operational management procedures (OMPs). The SPMWG is the body for 
deliberations on management, development and operational issues in the sector. 
DAFF prefers that rights holders be represented by a selected member of a recognised 
stakeholder association (DAFF 2010). This is to try and prevent membership of the 
SPMWG growing to unmanageable numbers and to ensure effectiveness and efficiency of 
the working group, which is consistent with the co-management principles discussed 
above. Thus it is mainly rights holders who belong to a stakeholder association that 
will have their interests and views represented on the governance structures. At the 
time of writing there were three recognised stakeholder associations in the small-
pelagics sector, namely South African Pelagic Fishing Industry Association  (SAPFIA), 
the Eastern Cape Pelagic Association (ECPA) and the Weskus Pelagiese Vissers 
Vereniging (West Coast Pelagic Fishers’ Association; WPVV).3 The first two are rights-
2
 Hutton T, Raakjær Nielsen J, Mayekiso M. 1999. Government–industry co-management arrangements within the 
South African deep-sea hake fishery. Paper presented at the International Workshop on Fisheries Comanagement, 
Penang, Malaysia, 23–28 August 1999 
3
 WPVV is defunct. A new labour union called the ‘South African Pelagic Fishers Union’ was registered to replace it, 
effected 1 April 2014 
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holder associations while the last was an association for skippers and crew members 
based on the West Coast. 
 
Stakeholder associations such as SAPFIA and ECPA are non-profit organisations formed 
to promote and protect the interests of their members. An association represents its 
members in negotiations with government or other organisations such as labour 
unions. The association secretariat communicates with its members on any new 
developments in the industry, changes in policy and legislation, and any other matters 
that are of interest to their members. There is an annual membership fee, used to run the 
organisation and its activities, which must be paid. In recent years SAPFIA has 
introduced a policy that allows a graduated membership fee rate based on size of the 
right. This is to encourage rights holders with small rights to join. SAPFIA argues that 
the interests of all members are handled equally, not on the basis of the size of the right 
and the related fee amount paid. Only members are invited to association meetings or 
receive communications on issues and decisions. Associations do not and cannot act on 
behalf of third parties such as rights holders with various agreements with their 
members. 
 
From 2006 to 2012 an average of 44% of anchovy rights holders were members of 
SAPFIA, 2% were members of ECPA and 8% were members of both SAPFIA and ECPA 
(JdG, DAFF, unpublished data).4 An average of 46% of the anchovy rights holders were 
not affiliated to either of the two associations (Figure 1). Of the sardine rights holders, 
an average of 13% were members of SAPFIA, 31% were members of ECPA and 8% were 
members of both associations. An average of 48% of the sardine rights holders were not 
affiliated to either of the two associations (Figure 1). 
 
The concern is that the views and interests of nearly half of the rights holders, in that 
they are non-affiliated, are not officially represented on the SPMWG. Government is 
anxious that the non-affiliated group needs to be better integrated as part of 
transformation of the industry and as part of inclusive management decision-making 
within the fishing industry (DEAT 2005a). 
 
Fragmentation in commons management is a global problem. The DARMA 
(Defragmenting Resource Management in Southern Africa) project, which this study was 
part of (see Acknowledgements), aimed to build networks and management approaches 
that can integrate resource management to enhance biodiversity of exploited commons 
while alleviating poverty at the same time. In this study, we aimed to try and understand 
why almost half of the rights holders are not actively participating in management of the 
small-pelagics fishery. A related question was whether the non-affiliated group can be 
brought into the fold so that their views and interests can be represented directly. 
 
                                                 
4
 The above statistics were calculated from actual paid-up members of the associations. The fishery performance 
review conducted in 2010 yielded very different statistics i.e. a perception survey indicated that 92 out of the 109 
rights holders (84%) were represented by an association and 73% of the 92 rights holders declared their confidence in 
these associations (DAFF 2012a)  
 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
5 
 
Definition of ‘small-rights holders’ and ‘economic viability’  
For this study, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) definition of a small 
business was applied when defining a small-rights holder. The DTI bases the 
definition of size of a business entity on its annual turnover. This varies among the 
various sectors (e.g. manufacturing, wholesale trade, commercial agents and allied 
services, finance and business services, community, social and personal services, etc.).5 
Based on the National Small Business Amendment Act (RSA 2003), the minimum 
annual turnover for a small business entity was put between R6 million and R12 million. 
Another important aspect of the definition of size is the number of people employed 
which, in the case of a small business, is between 10 and 49 people. 
 
For the period 2006 to 2012, the average landed value of raw sardine was R1 526 per 
tonne.6 If we applied the lowest annual turnover (R6 million) stipulated by the DTI and 
applied this to raw sardine landed value, this would mean that for 2012 (when the 
TAC for sardine was 100 000 t [DAFF 2012b]) a sardine-only rights holder would have 
required 3 932 t of sardine to achieve a turnover of R6 million (only the five biggest 
companies in the sector met this criterion). 
 
Note that the DTI figures are 10 years out of date. It is likely that the minimum turnover 
figures must be higher by now, given annual inflation and a general increase in the cost 
of doing business. 
 
The size of the right raises the issue of what a ‘minimum economically viable right’ might 
be. This is also related to the policy objective that rights holders are expected to invest in 
the industry to create employment and as a demonstration of long-term interest in 
remaining in the industry. Although this might vary annually depending on the size of 
the TAC, the majority of rights holders cannot even meet the criteria for being 
categorised as a ‘small business’. Based on this definition, rights holders who have 
rights only in sardine without rights in anchovy are likely to face an even greater 
challenge. 
 
The small-pelagics fishing sector 
The small-pelagics fishery is a capital-intensive sector based on rights for sardine 
Sardinops sagax and anchovy Engraulus encrasicolus, with associated bycatches 
for round herring Etrumeus whiteheadii, Cape horse-mackerel Trachurus capensis, 
chub mackerel Scomber japonicus and meso-pelagic species which include lightfish 
Maurolicus walvisensis and lanternfish Lampanyctodes hectoris. The sector is the 
largest in terms of landed volume and second only to hake (Merluccius spp.) with regard 
to landed value (George Warman Publications 2013). Most of the sardine is canned 
while a small proportion is packed for bait. The anchovy is reduced to fishmeal, fish oil 
                                                 
5
 The lack of fishery-sector-specific operational definitions calls for socio-economic studies to define what an 
economically viable right could be in each fishing sector, in order to assist with decisions about minimum viable 
quotas 
6
 The average landed value for raw sardine was calculated using information obtained from factories by JdG for the 
years 2006 to 2012. The value of anchovy used to be based on the fishmeal price. The Fishmeal Association does not 
give recommendations on this price any more because of competition laws and past cases around price fixing (Hara 
2013). Factories and rights holders therefore negotiate the prices individually. For this reason it was not possible to 
obtain an average price for landed anchovy 
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and fish paste. In 2012, there were six canneries, six fishmeal plants and about 15 
packing entities officially registered as operational and active (JdG, DAFF, unpublished 
data). In 2005, the government of South Africa issued 15-year (2006 to 2020) long-
term fishing rights for the sector (DEAT 2005b). At the start of the 2006 fishing 
season, 115 entities had been awarded long-term rights in small pelagic fish (75 for 
both sardine and anchovy and 40 for sardine only). By 2012 the number of rights 
holders had reduced to 109 (71 held both anchovy and sardine rights and 38 held 
sardine-only rights), mainly due to consolidation and rights transfers. The number of 
approved vessels, based on applications received during the 2006 rights allocation 
process, was about 100. This figure was set as the industry limit (DEAT 2005b). The 
number of vessels that were effectively operational had declined to 74 by 2012.7 The 
sector is managed using OMPs, which recommend annual TACs for anchovy and 
sardine and TABs for the associated bycatch species (Fairweather et al 2006; 
Butterworth 2007). 
 
 
In 2002, South Africa committed to the implementation of an ecosystems approach to 
fisheries (EAF) (Shannon et al. 2004, 2010; DEAT 2005a, 2005b; Petersen et al. 
2010). The small-pelagics sector is one of the fisheries in which an EAF is being 
implemented (Paterson et al. 2010; Paterson and Petersen 2010). The requirement 
for active and meaningful stakeholder participation in management is part of one of 
EAF’s three top objectives – ‘Ability to achieve’ (FAO 2003; Paterson et al. 2010; 
Petersen et al. 2010). This was supposed to be enhanced through implementation of 
long-term rights (Hara 2013). 
 
Methods 
A number of approaches were used to collect the data and information for the study. 
These approaches were: unstructured interviews, meetings and a workshop; analysis 
of landings; and ethnographs of small-rights holders. These are outlined below. 
 
Interviews and meetings 
Eight small-rights holders that are not affiliated to any of the stakeholder associations 
and three rights holders that are members of SAPFIA were interviewed. A workshop 
                                                 
7
 Various reasons, including increased fuel cost, reduced factory capacity, fi sh availability, vessel age, the NEMA: Air 
Quality Act (RSA 2004), etc. led to this reduction in vessel usage (JdG, DAFF, unpublished data) 
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attended by 12 people (comprising rights holders from both the Western Cape and 
the Eastern Cape) was held in 2012. Five key informants working for companies that 
are members of SAPFIA (three) and ECPA (two) were interviewed. Interviews were 
also conducted with the Secretary General of SAPFIA and the chairman of ECPA, three 
managers for large companies that are rights holders and also vessel- and factory 
owners on the West Coast and in Cape Town. Four vessel owners that do not have 
rights but catch fish on behalf of rights holders, and the Chairman and Secretary of 
the former WPVV and officials from Branch: Fisheries Management, DAFF, responsible 
for managing the small-pelagics sector, were also interviewed. 
 
One of the authors (JdG) is a fisheries manager working in the day-to-day operational 
management of the small- pelagics sector. Two of the authors (MMH and JR) attended 
the ‘Performance Review’ workshops (DAFF 2012a) on long-term rights in the sector 
that were held on the 25th (West Coast) and 26th (Cape Town) of June  2012,  at which 
the results of the reviews of the performance of rights holders since 2006 against the set 
objectives for each sector were discussed between DAFF and stakeholders. 
 
Analysis of landings 
Following the workshops, meetings and interviews, it was realised that one of the key 
reasons why so many small- rights holders remained outside the stakeholder 
associations was related to operational dynamics of the industry, especially the 
catching and processing agreements. It is important, therefore, to understand how 
these work. Hence an analysis was conducted of official DAFF data on the size of the 
catch, the vessels responsible for catching the TAC for the 2012 season, and where the 
catch was landed. These data were analysed in terms of: 
 
number of vessels that had been registered as operational for the season and the spread 
in ownership of these vessels; 
number of vessels that delivered fish at the seven largest canning and fishmeal factories; 
the proportion of the sectoral TAC that had been landed at each of those seven 
processing factories; 
the proportions of the TAC landed at the seven factories that had been caught by vessels 
that belonged or did not belong to the factories; and 
the proportions of the 2012 TAC held by (i) SAPFIA members, (ii) ECPA members 
or (iii) non-affiliated rights holders. 
 
A note on data accessibility 
Difficulties with databases were experienced at two levels. The first was that contact 
details for rights holders captured on DAFF’s Marine Administration System (MAST) 
were outdated. Although DAFF requires parties to notify the Department of any 
changes to contact details, this is not done in most instances. This, in turn, leads to 
third parties receiving invalid contact details when these are sourced via the Public 
Access to Information Act (PAIA; RSA 2000).8 For our research, rights holders whose 
details from MAST were invalid had to be found through word-of-mouth. Secondly, 
                                                 
8
 This, sometimes, gives the perception that invalid data are being provided deliberately by the Department, yet in 
reality DAFF can only provide information that is available and updated by rights holders 
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PAIA legislation requires DAFF to release information using a prescribed process, 
because the information is presumed to be private under the PAIA law. Permission to 
access specific types of information – such as catches, processing agreements, etc. – for 
an individual rights holder for inter alia research purposes, requires a PAIA application 
and prior approval by the DDG of the Branch: Fisheries Management. Having been 
granted access, it was found that the data were not always available in the required 
format, rendering interpretation difficult. In both contexts our efforts were facilitated by 
JdG, a DAFF Fisheries Manager, but our experience highlighted challenges associated 
with public access to fisheries information. Additionally, there is no guarantee that access 
will be granted because the final decision rests with the DDG. 
 
Results 
Proportion of small-rights holders 
The cut-off limit of 3 932 t (or 3.932% of the 2012 sardine TAC) was used to analyse 
the proportion of rights holders who would have been classified as small-rights holders 
based on the 2012 sardine TAC. Only five of the 109 rights holders (i.e. 5%) that were 
allocated sardine rights had equivalent to or more than this amount (Figure 2). Of the 
109 rights holders, 38 (35%) received sardine-only rights while 71 (65%) received a 
combination of sardine rights and anchovy rights.9 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 Applicants had to decide on their directed fishing rights requirements during the 2006 long-term rights allocation 
process, i.e. the sardine:anchovy preferred ratios. Once awarded, these may not change until 2020 (the next round of 
allocations). Sardine-only rights holders opted not to venture into an anchovy-directed fishery at the time of 
allocations  
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Vessel ownership 
A total of 74 vessels fished during the 2012 season (DAFF 2012a). These were owned by 
47 different vessel owners. Thus of the 109 rights holders in 2012, 62 (57%) did not 
register as vessel owners. Thirty-nine (53%) of the 74 vessels were owned by 12 
companies that owned two or more vessels each, with Oceana owning the highest 
number (Table 1), whereas the other 35 (47%) vessels were owned by single-vessel 
owners. 
 
Catch processing 
Vessels are permitted to offload catch at various factories (provided these are 
reflected on the permits), which is encouraged by DAFF for various reasons as 
explained below. Table 2 shows the number of vessels that delivered catch to each of 
the seven largest canning and fishmeal factories during the 2012 season. The total 
small-pelagics catch for 2012 was 487 391 t. This included the TAC for sardine and 
anchovy as well as all associated bycatches. Of this, 469 673 t (96%) was delivered to 
the seven largest factories (Figure 3). 
 
Interest group rights holdings 
Of the 2012 TAC for small pelagic fish, 68% was held by members of SAPFIA, 8% by 
members of ECPA and 24% by non-affiliated rights holders (Figure 4). 
 
Perspectives and insights from stakeholder interviews, workshop and 
meetings 
Small-rights holders indicated during interviews that one of the biggest problems 
they face is that the size of their rights is too small for them to invest in their own 
vessels as individual rights holders. This then requires trying to form consortia to 
buy a vessel as a group or buying shares in existing vessels. Some had gone the first 
route with success but others with disaster. For example, a number of small-rights 
holders had combined to buy an old vessel that was affordable. They were obliged to 
use their own resources because they had been unable to secure a bank loan. Banks 
apparently argue that they do not view a fishing right as surety. The operational costs 
of running an old vessel proved too high, to the extent that they had to abandon its 
use. The consortium broke up as a result. Another group of small-rights holders said 
they had a vessel and were using it to catch their rights. Apart from catching their 
own rights, they also caught fish for other rights holders that did not have vessels. 
This was the only way that the vessel could be kept profitable. A woman that had been 
in the industry since the medium-term rights allocation of 2002 said that she had 
inherited the business from her deceased father. She had been working in the 
company with her father for some time before he died and as such she had a sound 
knowledge of the industry. 
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Her company had its own vessel. Apart from rights in sardine, she also had rights 
in hake and linefish. This portfolio of rights enabled her to run a successful fishing 
business. She said that she helped other small-rights holders through catching 
agreements. She was a member of SAPFIA. Another individual rights holder with a 
vessel also had another rights portfolio and ran a bait-packing factory in Mitchells 
Plain, Cape Town. He also said that it was very helpful to have other rights, such as 
linefish, apart from sardine rights, and that having his own factory made it possible to 
add value to both his sardine and linefish rights. He said that he was not a member of 
any association. He seemed to regard his membership of a particular political party as 
being more important. 
 
Most small-rights holders did not have their own vessels or shares in vessels and were 
obliged to enter into catching and processing agreements with vessel owners and factory 
owners. The way the catching sector is organised means that once one has a catching 
and processing agreement, one’s involvement in one’s own right becomes minimal, 
because it is the skipper and his crew who go to sea and then deliver the catch to 
the factory that one has a processing agreement with. One is then informed by the 
factory about how much catch was delivered on one’s quota and how much one is 
owed by the factory after costs have been deducted. Some elect to sell their annual quota 
to vessel owners or factories, thereby receiving payment upfront and having no 
further direct involvement. Given such operational dynamics, most rights holders 
without vessels did not see any purpose in being members of associations or in 
forming their own. Some claimed that they receive all relevant information from their 
partners in the catching and processing agreements, thus negating the necessity for 
membership. 
 
The fact that there are so many rights holders without vessels (57% in 2012) means 
that there exists a business opportunity for vessel owners without rights to catch fish on 
behalf of rights holders. Thus, apart from factories, there exist vessel owners whose 
only business is to catch fish for those without vessels. A number of skippers and/or 
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former rights holders who own vessels but lost their rights had entered this kind of 
business. 
 
As manager of the sector and convener of the SPMWG, DAFF would like all rights 
holders to be represented on the working group, which is the primary formal 
platform for expressing views and providing inputs into management. This would 
ensure that stakeholder interests are heard and protected. DAFF sees the working 
group as an important means for rights holders to keep up to date with developments 
in the sector and also for discussing policy and legislative and operational issues. The 
working group, however, cannot accommodate all 109 rights holders at its meetings. 
The general terms of reference (ToR) for management working groups (MWGs) (DAFF 
2010, p 2) state that an ‘MWG shall have no more than ten members who are 
representatives of recognised industrial bodies. The limited size of the MWG is to 
ensure that the MWG is effective and efficient.’ Hence rights holders are advised that 
official representation on the working group can be through industry stakeholder 
associations only. Nevertheless, the ToR state that the chair of the working group may 
use his or her discretion to allow or invite rights holders who are not members of an 
association, or other stakeholders, to attend working group meetings as observers. 
 
Three mini portraits (ethnographs) of small-rights holders 
In the following accounts, three rights holders gave personal accounts of how they 
entered the industry and the challenges of being a small-rights holder that they have 
encountered. These anecdotes provide insights into some of the issues and difficulties 
faced by this group of rights holders. The MLRA created a situation whereby, for the 
majority of rights holders, quotas were allocated in small proportions of the TAC, in 
order to apportion the resource more widely as part of transformation. For small-
rights holders, finding a way of making use of their rights is the ideal and desired 
outcome, although usually not very easy. 
 
Craig – trying to become established and survive 
Craig1010 started working in the fishing industry at an early age because his father had 
fished for a living. He inherited the family business. When rights were allocated in 
2006, Craig received a sardine quota but it was difficult to run a viable fishing 
business. This was for two main reasons: difficulties of obtaining capital for a vessel; 
and the small quota he received (0.38% of sardine TAC). He had explored ways of 
working together with other small-rights holders in a similar situation, yet it was still 
not possible to source capital for a vessel, even as a group. Ultimately he, together with 
other rights holders, had to resort to entering into catching agreements with vessel 
owners in order to increase the amount of fish caught. Craig observed that the 
largest proportion of the quota in the sector was held by large companies and, as a 
result, selling small amounts of fish to bait packing and canning companies was always 
in competition with the large fishing companies. Craig was trying to use his quota 
himself, in preference to selling it to a company, although this was difficult. Craig felt 
that the stakeholder associations represented the concerns of the large companies 
whereas the difficulties faced by small- rights holders/companies, such as access to 
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 Real names have been changed 
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capital, were excluded from the agendas of these associations. Hence he chose not to join 
any of the associations. 
 
Nico – selling one’s quota 
Like Craig, Nico had little formal education and entered the fishing industry 
through his father. Prior to promulgation of the MLRA (1998b), fishing seemed a 
relatively lucrative enterprise, because one had enough quota to be comfortable, if not 
well off. With the advent of long-term rights under the MLRA, Nico was allocated a 
right (0.45% of sardine TAC) which was not enough to invest in his own vessel and fish 
on his own profitably. The reason for this was that each sea trip required fuel, a 
skipper and crew. One had to offset these costs through one’s quota. Since Nico’s 
quota did not allow for this, it was easier for him to sell his quota rather than use it 
personally. Large fishing companies are usually happy to buy quota from small-rights 
holders due to inter alia TAC reductions. The net effect of selling a right effectively 
made Craig a ‘paper-quota holder’, which is against DAFF’s policies. 
 
Peter – issuing of rights to non-fishers 
Peter and his colleagues knew of someone who applied for rights despite having never 
fished. This man qualified through being a ‘historically disadvantaged individual’ (HDI), 
as defined in the MLRA, and, as a result, was granted a right (0.76% of sardine and 
0.26% of anchovy TAC). This is because, when the MLRA was promulgated, it set out to 
redress past inequalities. At first, Peter was happy for him and assumed that the man 
would learn how to fish and become personally involved in the industry. Instead, the 
man bought a vessel and employed a skipper (and crew) to work for him. He also 
bought quota from fishers who did not have their own vessels. Peter was unhappy 
about this because this man was profiting from fishing without having any history in 
fishing, nor any intention of becoming a ‘proper sea-going fisher’. For this man, 
fishing was a purely business enterprise, which contrasted with people like Peter, for 
whom fishing was not only employment, but also a vocation. Peter regretted that he 
did not report to DAFF, during the rights allocations process, applicants such as this 
person, who had no historical interest in fishing and whose only interest was to profit 
from fishing without any desire to commit to the industry. As a result of the 
categorisation of potential rights holders as HDIs, several cases like this one emerged, 
which resulted in fishers like Peter, who had fished their whole lives, receiving reduced 
quota. Peter had a catching and processing agreement with a fishing company, since 
the small quota made it impossible to invest in his own vessel. Peter regarded belonging 
to an association as unnecessary because he did not actually fish and, like most 
fishers, he felt that he was represented by companies that he had a catching and 
processing agreement with. 
 
Discussion 
Catching and processing webs and networks 
When applying for renewal of their annual fishing permit, 11 11 rights holders are 
required to state, firstly, which vessels they will use to catch their quota and, secondly, 
to which factories they will deliver their catch. Rights holders are encouraged by 
                                                 
11
 Within long-term rights, rights holders have to renew their fishing permits annually in accordance with the MLRA 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
14 
 
DAFF to list as many vessels as possible that they would use and as many factories as 
possible to which they would deliver their catch. This is to give rights holders broad 
options and flexibility. Also, because fish are not always caught close to the factory 
where rights holders usually deliver, this flexibility allows fuel savings, quicker 
turnaround time and other practical economic benefits. Additionally, in the event of 
vessel breakdown, it is desirable to land and offload at the nearest factory. The permit 
conditions do not require that the rights holders state the terms of the catching and/or 
processing agreements that they enter into.12 
 
The majority of rights holders (57%) were not registered as vessel owners in 2012 
(some stated that they have shares in some vessels that they use), necessitating 
having catching agreements with vessel owners. The sardine TAC declined from 204 
000 t in 2006 to 162 436 t in 2007 and then to as low as 90 000 t annually for the 
years 2008 to 2011 (JdG, DAFF, unpublished data). The downturn in biomass of 
sardine in recent years and the general variability in geographic availability 
(Hutchings et al. 2009; van der Lingen et al. 2011) meant that most rights holders did 
not have viable 13  quotas that would allow them confidence to invest in their own 
vessels. Few rights holders have their own factories, and hence most have to have 
processing agreements. Of the 96% of the 2012 TAC that was delivered to seven 
factories, only 24% was caught by factory-owned vessels, the other 76% being caught 
by non-factory-owned vessels through catching and processing agreements. 
 
Figure 5 shows the complex web of possible catching and delivery agreements that 
exist in the sector among the various  types and  categories  of rights holders  and 
stakeholders. Rights holders who do not have vessels enter into catching agreements 
with factories that have vessels, rights holders that have vessels or vessel owners who 
do not have rights (linkage ➀). Thus rights holders can use more than one vessel to 
catch their quota over the course of the season. The vessels deliver catch to various 
factories depending on whose catch it is. Given that rights holders will have processing 
agreements with more than one factory, they can instruct the contracted vessel to deliver 
their quota to various factories over the duration of the season (➁). Vessels may also 
be catching fish for more than one rights holder at a time, so that they may deliver 
specific amounts to specific factories from one catch (➁) in some cases, vessel-owning 
factories also contract additional external vessels to catch the fish for them (➂). For 
example, the seven factories named in Figure 3 used contracted vessels to catch and 
deliver their fish apart from using their own vessels (Table 2). 
 
                                                 
12
 The permit conditions also do not require that the rights holders state the length of the agreements, although such 
agreements must be valid for the current season. Rights holders themselves choose and determine the agreement 
period. Some look for and/or negotiate better agreements from year to year 
13
 While there is need for definition of an agreed formula for calculating what a ‘minimum economically viable quota’ 
(and the combination of sardine and anchovy therein) in the industry might be (collecting accounting data for rights 
holders did not form part of this study, neither are such data readily available), most small-rights holders had been 
allocated less than 0.4% of the sardine TAC and/or less than 0.4% of the anchovy TAC (George Warman Publications 
2007). Thus the value of the quota of most rights holders was well below DTI’s 2003 defi nition of a small business 
(with turnover of R6 million–R12 million annually) (RSA 2003). Indeed, most small-rights holders stated that their 
allocated rights provided little opportunity to make investments in catching and/or processing equipment as 
individuals, given the cost-earning structure (high volume/low margins) in the small-pelagics sector 
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In other instances, rights holders lease14 their annual quota or a proportion of it to 
factories or vessel owners (➃). In the case that quota is leased to vessel owners, these 
will have processing agreements with various factories. Given that vessel owners can 
have their own processing agreements with factories, these could also be used by the 
rights holders without vessels, indirectly making the network of factories where one’s 
quota can be delivered for processing even more extensive. Factories use either their 
own vessels (➁) to catch their quota (or quota that they have leased from other rights 
holders) or contract out the catching (➂) to other vessels. Among the big factories on 
the West Coast, it is normal to take delivery of each other’s catch (➁). Thus the 
records show, for example, that Oceana’s vessels land fish at Oranjevis or West Point, 
and vice versa. The sharing of catch among the factories allows them flexibility in case 
of: bad weather preventing vessels from landing at a particular factory; a factory already 
running at full capacity; factory breakdowns; or labour disputes. Therefore this 
complex web of agreements allows and enables flexibility among the parties.15 
 
Is it necessary to belong to an industry stakeholder association? 
Given the catching and processing arrangements that rights holders without vessels, who 
are also mostly small-quota holders, have to enter into, is it necessary for them to belong 
to a stakeholder association so that their interests and views are represented? 
 
                                                 
14
 When a rights holder leases out their quota it becomes difficult for them to manage the catch 
15
 Regardless of the web of agreements, it remains the responsibility of each rights holder to ensure proper and 
accurate management of their quota in accordance with DAFF’s policy and legislation 
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In the past, high membership fees had been stated by some small-rights holders as the 
reason for not applying for membership of SAPFIA. According to the Secretary General of 
SAPFIA, membership fees were subsequently restructured into graduated fee amounts 
based on the size of the right. This was done to encourage small-rights  holders to join 
the Association. Some small-rights holders stated that they preferred to stay out of 
SAPFIA because it was dominated by large-rights holders with pre-1994 historical 
rights (Hara and Raakjær 2009; Nyikahadzoi et al. 2010; this study). Belonging to 
SAPFIA would therefore subsume their voices and interests. The formation of the 
national small, medium and micro-sized enterprises (SMMEs) Fishing Forum (George 
Warman Publications 2013) was based on this thinking (Hara and Raakjær 2009). The 
ECPA and the former WPVV are examples of two geographically based smaller 
organisations that represent the interests of their members independently of SAPFIA. 
Both have membership on the SPMWG. In some instances, rights holders believed that 
belonging to an industry–stakeholder association would strengthen their chances of 
obtaining and retaining a right/ quota, whereas some believed that remaining outside 
such organisations, especially if one was from a historically disadvantaged group, would 
politically strengthen one’s case for obtaining and retaining a right (Hara and Raakjær 
2009). 
 
The need for admitting into the industry more rights holders from historically 
marginalised groups, as part of transformation, resulted in the fragmentation of quota 
into many small proportions, with the majority of rights holders obtaining less that 
0.4% of sardine and/or anchovy TAC (see George Warman Publications 2007). Most 
of these small proportions are not economically viable on their own, especially in a 
sector based on ‘high volume/low margin’ (Hara and Raakjær 2009). The proportions 
are even more uneconomical in seasons when the TAC is low, as has been the case 
for sardine, the species in which all quota holders have had rights since 2006. It is 
difficult, therefore, for small-rights holders to invest in their own infrastructure. This 
leaves them little choice other than to enter into catching and processing agreements, 
thereby characterising them as ‘paper-quota holders’. The majority of rights holders 
that have not taken up membership in the existing industry–stakeholder associations 
are those that do not have their own vessels. Most state that they obtain information 
from their partners in the catch and delivery agreements. They argue that it is not 
necessary, therefore, to belong to a stakeholder association. Most of their partners 
belong to SAPFIA, which is the strongest industry–stakeholder association and whose 
members held nearly 70% of the volume of rights in 2012 (Figure 4). According to this 
argument, their interests are thus already being (indirectly) taken care of by the 
strongest player in the industry. In other words the transaction costs of being a 
member of a stakeholder association are not justified if one is participating in the 
industry only indirectly through catching and processing agreements. For this reason,  
most  small-rights  holders do not see any reason for forming their own groups. The 
problem, however, is that the small-rights holders do not have the same interests and 
concerns as their agreement partners – the vessel owners and factory owners. Rights 
holders would presumably like to retain their rights in the industry in the next round, 
while factory owners would like to retain their current strong position in the 
industry. In fact, one of the conditions for renewal of one’s rights after the current 
round of long-term rights expires in 2020 is demonstration of investment and active 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
17 
 
participation in the industry (DEAT 2005a), which means that the small-rights holders 
relying on catching and processing agreements will have to show active interest in their 
rights if they are not to lose them.16 At the same time, stakeholder associations such as 
SAPFIA are concerned largely with looking after, promoting and protecting their 
member’s interests (George Warman Publications 2013). It is inaccurate to presume 
that, by extension, the existing stakeholder associations are also interested in 
ensuring the interests and concerns of non-members simply because they have 
catching and delivery agreements with their members. 
 
Although DAFF would ideally like all rights holders to be represented on the 
industry management structures (S Pheeha, DAFF, pers. comm.) as a means of 
enhancing inclusive governance of the industry and defragmentation of management, 
South Africa’s constitution gives citizens the ‘right of association’ and, similarly, their 
right not to belong to associations. Thus, the rights holders cannot be forced to form 
or belong to an association in order to qualify for representation on the governing 
structures. The political dynamic is that, as long as their rights and economic interests 
under current arrangements are not threatened, most of the currently non-affiliated 
rights holders have little or no incentive to join the existing stakeholder associations or 
to form new independent associations of their own. 
 
Conclusions 
Stakeholder participation is considered an integral component of changing ownership 
in fisheries (and of EAF) in the post-apartheid transformation of access rights to natural 
resources in South Africa, as well as of general fisheries policy for inclusive and 
democratic governance of the industry. From the preceding analysis and discussion, it 
is apparent that certain mismatches exist between government’s request for rights 
holders to belong to a stakeholder association, the interests of large, established rights 
holders and the challenges and concerns of small-rights holders. DAFF’s interest is 
that those involved in the industry should belong to a stakeholder association so that they 
can participate directly in decision-making, stay updated on day-to-day operational 
matters, research findings and development of the sector, and take part in addressing 
long-term sustainability issues. By not actively participating in management through 
direct representation, such rights holders do not ensure that majority considerations 
and inputs are being used in decision-making. Although the reasons for not taking 
up membership of rights-holder associations could actually be those given during 
interviews, non-participation could also be indicative of misunderstanding or 
misinformation about the objectives of the SPMWG and other processes that have 
been put in place to improve management of the sector. Whatever the genuine 
reasons, it is imperative that DAFF makes an effort to understand them in order to 
improve inclusive management of the sector. 
 
Transforming the sector is a rather complex matter. It is important to remember that 
the small-pelagics industry operates on a high volume/low margin basis (Hara and 
Raakjær 2009). The sector is highly capital-intensive and only a few companies 
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 DAFF is likely to try to eliminate the holding of ‘paper quotas’ in the next round of rights allocation  
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dominate the entire value chain from catching to marketing. Furthermore, the sector 
has to cope with periodic fluctuations in the annual TAC. 17  This combination of 
factors has created an economic and operational environment which makes it difficult 
for small-rights holders to become established as independent entities, thereby 
indirectly  driving a  sizeable  proportion of them to become paper-quota holders. As 
visualised in Figure 5, there exists a complex web of catching and processing 
agreements within the sector. This web has been part of the history of the fishery and 
Raakjær Nielsen and Hara (2006) questioned whether genuine redistribution of rights 
had really taken place when the state introduced long-term rights in 2006. 
 
Rights-holder participation in management needs to be seen in the light of how the 
sector is operating de facto. It is evident that SAPFIA members directly or indirectly 
(through catching and processing agreements) control more than 90% of the landings 
in the sector. SAPFIA and the ECPA are represented and are actively participating in 
management through representation on the SPMWG. On the one hand, it can be argued 
that networks and associations exist that allow for stakeholder participation. On the 
other hand, the situation in the sector seems to be a status quo of what has been 
happening during the last decade and, in effect, transformation has not led to 
increased active participation in the industry for most small-rights holders. A question 
to ask is whether government is enforcing transformation adequately, given the 
continued prevalence of paper-quota holders. 
 
As indicated in the three mini portraits and interviews, small-rights holders choose 
not to participate because the catching and processing agreements enable both parties 
to an agreement to work ‘around the system’, or quotas are sold outright to vessel 
owners and/or factories. In this context, small-rights holders who engaged in these 
catching and processing agreements consider that they have no reason to join a 
stakeholder association. 
 
Small-rights holders have generally been unable to establish economically viable 
enterprises because, in addition to individual quotas being too small, they have been 
lacking management skills and access to capital and because the industry operates in a 
global and highly competitive market (Isaacs et al. 2007; Hara and Raakjær 2009). 
Isaacs et al. (2007) made the observation that the state will have to play a more 
interventionist role by supporting small, emerging enterprises in order to ensure 
effective transformation. The state needs to establish institutional structures, both for 
the provision of credit facilities and to actively support skills development, if its aims to 
redistribute economic property rights and transform the ownership of this and other 
industries are to take lasting effect. 
 
                                                 
17
 The operational management procedure for the sector has a built-in mechanism that prevents TACs from being 
reduced by more than 20% (sardine) and 25% (anchovy) annually (de Moor and Butterworth 2008) when the resource 
is abundant. This is in order to promote industry stability by protecting rights holders from large interannual variability 
in catch and thus disastrous business conditions. Even then, resource preservation at low biomass necessitates a larger 
reduction in TACs, resulting in appreciable changes such as from the high TACs of sardine of over 400 000 t in the 
early millennium to the current TACs of between 90 000 and 100 000 t 
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According to Hara and Raakjær (2009), the government has argued that, while it was 
important to transform the industry and broaden participation for the historically 
disadvantaged, the proliferation of rights holders might not necessarily translate into 
effective participation. It might, therefore, be  necessary  to  allow  consolidation in  
some sectors in order to improve effective participation (DEAT 2007). 18  One can 
argue that this is exactly what is happening in the small-pelagics sector. Most small-
rights holders are being indirectly represented by SAFPIA or ECPA through being 
represented by the company with whom they have a catching and/or processing 
agreement. 
 
Despite the foregoing, the authors are sympathetic to including small-rights holders 
in management. Our findings clearly show that most small-rights holders feel that they 
have little to gain from participating in management due to the structure of the 
industry. It is important, therefore, to focus on how to ensure genuine participation 
by small-rights holders in a fully transformed fishery. We believe that small-rights 
holders can be fully integrated into the sector (although probably not in large 
numbers). Clearly there is no easy fix regarding their participation and this will require 
substantial support from DAFF and acceptance from all recognised associations. 
Here, based on our own experiences in conducting this research, we would like to 
raise the question of how accessible the fishing industry really is to people, especially 
to those that had been marginalised formerly. As researchers, we experienced 
difficulties in understanding the data provided by DAFF and it was difficult to make 
contact with parties using details provided by MAST. For rights holders who have gained 
little knowledge of the industry since 2006, probably as a result of over-reliance on 
catching and processing agreements, it may be difficult for them to navigate through 
DAFF’s structural and management environment. Working through government 
administrative systems can be challenging at the best of times, for various reasons. This 
might present difficulties for rights holders who do not understand government 
processes and who do not have support when dealing with government bureaucracy. 
Because of the frustrations that this can bring, it can be easier for rights holders to sell 
their quotas rather than try to learn the ropes of the industry and its protocols. It is for 
this reason that we argue for structural shifts in the management of this industry – in 
terms of who enters the industry as well as how accessible this entry is. 
 
In continuing to make space for small-rights holders in the small-pelagics fishing 
industry, we argue that structures need to be put in place to ensure that those trying 
to make a living out of fishing are given the space to do so without having to sell their 
quotas. As the case studies and interviews suggest, there are still rights holders, 
especially in the category of HDI, that are not skilled or experienced in the practice of 
running a commercial fishing company (Hara and Raakjær 2009), which is one of the 
key factors for success in the sector.1919 Some of the small-rights holders have called 
                                                 
18
 The Policy for the Transfer of Commercial Fishing Rights (RSA 2009) prescribes how a right may be transferred. 
The Department requires a Transferee to be at least as transformed as the Transferor in order to promote 
transformation in the fishing sector  
19
 One of the requirements for being granted a right is the capability to run a successful fishing business. DAFF 
therefore grants rights on the basis that rights holders have the skills or the potential to actively participate in the 
industry 
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for training and mentoring programmes driven by government in order to empower 
and  help them to become established in the industry and hence to ensure genuine 
transformation. Such programmes do not necessarily have to be run by DAFF. There 
are other government departments, such as DTI, as well as NGOs that have the 
mandate to undertake such programmes. In other instances, some of those who have 
fished all their lives have been excluded from the industry by the rights allocation 
process because they do not fit the category of HDI. In this context, the structure that 
we argue needs to be in place is a rights allocation process that retains skills and that 
allocates rights to those that are deserving, not only to enforce transformation but also to 
ensure that a best-skilled sector is achieved to the benefit of South African society. 
What the allocation process needs to be able to do in future, therefore, is identify 
and allocate rights to genuine fishers with interest in the industry – those willing to stay 
the course and build durable fishing businesses. 
 
In reality, very few small-rights holders fish on an individual or private basis or are direct 
members of the recognised stakeholder associations. We have attempted to illustrate 
why this may be the case and have raised some of the issues and practices that result 
from this. For all stakeholders to be involved in the industry and in management of the 
sector, closer attention needs to be paid to the everyday realities of individual small-
rights holders and the challenges that they face which debilitate their active participation 
in the governance of the industry. 
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